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Abstract 
 
The fair exchange of resources provides a basis for developing morality, yet research 
has rarely examined the role of group processes that are central to children’s world. In this 
article, we describe a new perspective as well as research demonstrating that group processes 
play a key role in the fair allocation of resources among children and adolescents. We 
contend that when children allocate resources, group processes and moral judgments are 
relevant, a developmental shift occurs in children’s ability to coordinate moral and group 
concerns, and group processes contribute to intergroup bias regarding allocations but also to 
efforts to consider the status of disadvantaged groups. Our perspective informs efforts to 
reduce prejudice as well as increase fairness and equality in situations in which group 
processes are relevant for allocating resources fairly.  
 
 
  
 
 
The fair allocation of resources is a central concept in theories of morality and has 
been widely studied in social science research, including psychology, sociology, and 
behavioral economics, as well as in related fields such as moral philosophy. Within the field 
of developmental science, the fair exchange of resources is fundamental to the development 
of morality. How individuals divide resources, evaluate the legitimacy of claims to resources, 
consider different legitimate claims , claim ownership, and prioritize fairness in allocation 
contexts is part of social life from early childhood into adulthood. Through exchanges over 
development, children and adolescents engage in processes that involve negotiating and 
compromising resources that contribute to acquiring concepts central to allocating resources 
fairly, such as equality, merit, need, and equity (1, 2). 
However, until recently, developmental science research has devoted little attention to 
the role of group processes (processes that occur when social categories are salient within an 
intergroup context) in relation to the fair distribution of resources. Allocating resources 
involves more than moral judgments; group processes are also part of deliberations 
concerning who gets how much and why. In fact, the role of group processes affects 
children's social and moral development in many ways, starting in early childhood. In this 
article, we make three points: Group processes are relevant for decisions regarding the fair 
allocation of resources; the coordination of moral and group concerns when deciding about 
allocating resources shifts from childhood to adolescence; and group processes contribute not 
only to displays of intergroup bias when allocating resources (reflecting biased attitudes) but 
also to efforts to rectify social inequalities and consider disadvantaged group status 
(awareness of group status and group identity for ensuring social equality). To make these 
points, we draw on our developmental theoretical model to describe research on the role of 
group processes in the fair allocation of resources, and touch on how group processes can 
both foster and hinder children’s and adolescents’ efforts to allocate resources fairly (3-5).  
 
 
 
Group Processes Are Relevant for Allocating Resources Fairly 
Individual moral decisions by children and adolescents, including those about 
allocating resources fairly, occur within contexts that require considering group processes. 
These processes include interpersonal friendships, which are known to influence children's 
moral decision making and sharing behavior (6). We know less about group processes when 
social categories (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity) are salient, and when children have to weigh 
both ingroup and outgroup considerations when deciding how to allocate resources. 
These processes involve group identification with social categories that emerge at a 
young age (7, 8), contributing to how we position ourselves in the social world and to whom 
we are loyal (9, 10); understanding group norms (11, 12), allowing us to reflect on mutual 
values that define acceptable attitudes or behaviors within and between groups; and 
knowledge of group status so we pay attention to social inequalities and disadvantaged status 
based on group membership (13, 14). Allocating resources fairly is typically perceived as a 
moral duty, yet group processes add complexity to this decision-making process.  
Children affiliate with groups early and these group identities significantly influence 
the development of their intergroup biases (e.g., 15). In addition, group norms matter. 
Supporting a norm of exclusion or a norm of inclusion is related to either promoting more 
negative or more positive attitudes toward the outgroup, respectively, and stronger group 
identification is related to more intergroup bias (16-18). From age 5, children are sensitive to 
the status of social groups, and awareness that their group holds high status increases the 
tendency to be biased to the ingroup, make judgments about exclusion, and reason using 
social conventions rather than morality when justifying these judgments (13, 14, 19).  
We assert that each of these aspects of group processes is related not just to intergroup 
attitudes but also to moral decision making. Along with the emergence of group processes, 
 
 
moral cognition surfaces early in childhood. Toddlers share spontaneously with others (20) 
and by early childhood, children’s moral judgment reflects knowledge about the impartiality 
and generalizability of moral principles (21). Children judge that fairness and equality are not 
subject to personal preferences (e.g., it is not all right to give all toys to oneself or to only 
your best friend), and moral judgments become more complex throughout childhood and 
adolescence. 
Yet children are clearly challenged by contexts that involve fair decision making, 
often prioritizing other considerations. These other considerations are not solely selfish 
desires as is often assumed when characterizing children’s conflicts (e.g., that children are 
either moral or selfish). Rather, with age, other legitimate considerations, such as those about 
group identity and group loyalty, take priority in certain contexts.  One of these contexts is 
intergroup settings, where group norms are increasingly enforced. For example, young 
children readily apply conventional norms to peers from their own group but often refrain 
from doing so when peers are identified as an outgroup (22).  
Group membership becomes increasingly salient throughout childhood and 
adolescence, and is often viewed in terms of group functioning.  Thus, while children reject 
purely selfish behavior, acts that support the group are often supported. Group affiliation is a 
necessary part of social life, creating a sense of community and collective action. Yet 
prioritizing group membership or group loyalty can directly contradict the moral obligation to 
allocate resources impartially and fairly. In such contexts, individuals reason that the ingroup 
needs more resources to function well and maintain a sense of group identity. Children 
recognize moral necessities but, depending on the salience of group identification or the 
nature of the resources, they also find decisions about allocating intergroup resources difficult 
for reasons related to group loyalty and identity. 
 
 
While much of the research on moral development, including studies on allocating 
resources fairly, has examined the role of societal norms (e.g., the role of authority, 
punishment, or conventions on morality; see 1, 2), fewer studies have looked at how group 
processes result in biases or changes in moral decision making (5). To some extent, this lack 
of focus on group processes was because intergroup attitudes were considered the province of 
adulthood; knowledge about group status and norms was assumed to emerge in adulthood, 
not childhood. Two lines of research changed this focus: developmental intergroup studies, 
which revealed that young children are aware of status hierarchies and group norms around 
gender, race, and ethnicity; and research on morality, which demonstrated that even young 
children, not just adolescents, hold strong beliefs about fairness and equality [AU: I’m not 
clear on what the parenthetical phrase refers to]). 
 The social reasoning developmental (SRD) perspective reflects these new lines of 
research by integrating morality and group processes into a theory to investigate children’s 
moral decision making in intergroup contexts (4, 5, 23). Drawing on developmental 
approaches to social identity (24) and group dynamics (11), and in conjunction with social 
domain theory (25, 26), the SRD perspective provides a guide for investigating moral and 
social-cognitive reasoning in the context of group processes. The SRD model contends that 
from early childhood, individuals increasingly reason about social relations while 
simultaneously considering issues of morality (fairness, equality, and rights), group processes 
(group identification, group norms, and status hierarchies), and psychological perspectives of 
the self and others (autonomy and mental state knowledge). Using this model, researchers 
have demonstrated how these concerns exist simultaneously when individuals decide about 
social inclusion and exclusion (5, 23). More recently, research has supported this model, 
demonstrating that, with age, children and adolescents reason about resource allocation while 
simultaneously considering issues of morality and group processes. 
 
 
 
Age-Related Changes Regarding Allocating Resources 
In research on resource allocation, ingroup concerns prevail in several contexts; as a 
result, children discriminate by distributing resources to benefit their own group at the 
expense of an outgroup (27-30). Yet recent studies have identified important developmental 
trends in how individuals weigh concerns over moral and group processes when allocating 
resources. 
In one study (31), young children did not always favor ingroup peers when 
considering how to allocate resources. When preschool-age children evaluated resource 
allocation norms held by peer groups (i.e., a norm that supported dividing equally or a norm 
that supported dividing to benefit the ingroup), they were more negative about ingroup 
members who deviated from a group norm of equality than a group norm of inequality. 
Children used fairness reasoning to support their rejection of an ingroup member who wanted 
to distribute unequally (benefitting the ingroup).  This suggests that preschoolers prioritize 
fairness over ingroup concerns. Between 3½ and 6 years, children differentiated their view 
about the ingroup member’s deviant act to distribute unequally from their expectations of 
what the group would like (more resources for their own group). This ability to differentiate 
the self’s evaluation of group allocations from the group’s preferences may be related to the 
emergence in early childhood of false belief theory of mind, the ability to recognize that 
others' intentions, beliefs, and desires may differ from one's own (32). 
To extend this point, from approximately 7 to 8 years, children develop a theory of 
social mind (33-35): They begin to appreciate that the emotions and intentions they attribute 
to individuals or groups within social relationships are not always the same as those held by 
the self (36). These social-cognitive developments contribute to a more advanced 
understanding of groups and how they function, and the ability from middle childhood to 
 
 
differentiate one's own viewpoint from that held by groups when deciding how to allocate 
resources (37). From this developmental point, as children become adolescents they begin to 
reflect on many group norms at different levels when deciding how to allocate resources. In a 
recent study those in middle childhood, as opposed to adolescence, were influenced by their 
own group's competitive norms and paid little attention to a generic cooperative norm when 
allocating resources (38).  
To illustrate this point, researchers established a generic norm by telling children 
and adolescents about two versions of a national art gathering—the United Kingdom National 
Art Competition (competitive generic norm) and the United Kingdom Charity Art Event 
(cooperative generic norm). The study established the ingroup norm for the competition by 
telling students that their team had a secret message for its members that was cooperative 
(sharing resources with all groups) or competitive (maximizing resources for the ingroup).  
Children showed significantly more in-group bias in their allocations than did adolescents 
when the in-group norm was competitive and the generic norm was cooperative (see Figure 
1). This indicated that, with age, there was increasing attention to both the in-group norm and 
generic norm when deciding to allocate resources. Unlike adolescents, children allocated 
resources consistent with the competitive in-group norm even when the larger generic norm 
was cooperative, revealing a lack of recognition that their own group goal was inconsistent 
with the larger cooperative goal underlying the allocation decision.  
A more extensive examination of age-related changes in children's and adolescents’ 
evaluations and reasoning surrounding fairly allocating resources revealed a developmental 
shift in how individuals coordinate moral (equal allocation of resources) and group (gender) 
concerns. Researchers investigated how individuals evaluated ingroup and outgroup members 
who challenged group norms that supported either an equal allocation of resources or an 
unequal allocation (39; see Table 1). For example, when a group had to decide whether to 
 
 
give the same amount of resources to two groups (boys’ and girls’ groups) or more for the in-
group, participants were asked whether they supported an in-group member who went against 
the group norm by supporting equal (if the group wanted to be unequal) or unequal (if the 
group wanted to be equal) allocations.  Nine- to 13-year-olds were asked how much they 
favored the in-group member who rejected the group norm about how to divide resources. 
Consistent with the SRD model, with age, participants were more likely to consider the group 
goals of their ingroup and to recognize that groups would like someone who wanted to help 
the ingroup by distributing more resources to themselves. 
Adolescents typically justified their evaluations by referring to issues of group 
functioning (“They would like how she wants her group to get more money”) and personal 
choice (“He has his personal opinions”). Yet 9-year-olds used moral justifications almost 
exclusively when explaining why they thought it was wrong for the deviant to allocate 
resources unequally (“He is just being greedy, which is not fair.”). Group concerns become 
highly salient by adolescence, which can be adaptive in an increasingly complex world of 
peers in which social exclusion from groups can have negative psychological consequences; 
the result can mean that youth prioritize group concerns over moral ones in some contexts. 
 As we discussed with younger children (31), with age, participants differentiated their 
own view of the best decision (dividing up equally) from what they expected the group would 
want. Younger participants expected that the group would make the same judgment as they 
would individually, which was to divide the resources equally.  In this context, unlike the one 
for younger children, older youth considered more variables and reasoned more, reflecting a 
coordination of perspectives. 
Knowledge About Group Processes Contributes to Efforts to Rectify Social Inequalities 
The context for much of resource allocation involves distributions to groups with 
differing statuses, so group status and equity are relevant concepts in studying fair resource 
 
 
allocation. We propose that when individuals consider disadvantaged status when deciding 
how to allocate resources, the role of group membership becomes part of the decision. In 
society, social inequalities often come from differences in social status, with resources 
distributed unequally to high- and low-status groups (40). Individuals’ awareness of social 
status and inequalities comes from knowledge of group processes, which develops early. 
Research into the emergence of fairness in the context of dyadic, triadic, and group 
interactions has paid little attention to the role of social status when examining fair allocation 
of resources. We contend that as children become aware of social hierarchies and social 
status, they focus on social inequalities and disadvantaged status based on group membership, 
using moral reasoning when prioritizing fairness and social conventional reasoning when 
prioritizing the status quo. 
 Recently, researchers investigated how children evaluate social inequalities when 
deciding how to allocate resources in intergroup contexts (41). Considering social inequalities 
in this context is difficult because in many cases, dividing resources equally perpetuates, or at 
least fails to correct, social inequality. In a test of whether children consider disadvantaged 
status when allocating resources, African American and European American kindergartners 
and fifth graders observed an unequal distribution norm that gave more resources to hospitals 
frequented by African American or European American children (41). Thus, the study 
presented both racial groups (which differ in terms of their access to hospital resources) as 
either advantaged or disadvantaged. Children judged the acceptability of an unequal 
allocation of medical resources on the basis of race, allocated medical supplies, evaluated 
different strategies for allocating resources, and completed a measure of status awareness 
(which was the extent to which children associated occupational status – high, low - with 
race).  
 
 
 With age, children were increasingly aware of disparities in wealth between African 
Americans and European Americans, and they judged an inequality of medical resource 
between groups more negatively. Furthermore, with age, children rectified the inequality of 
resources instead of perpetuating it, but only when African American children were 
disadvantaged. When European American children were disadvantaged, children did not 
systematically allocate more resources to one group over another. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, 
when African American hospitals were disadvantaged, children who viewed inequality as 
wrong and were aware of wealth disparities in society between the two groups were more 
likely to rectify than perpetuate the resource inequality (and with age, to reason based on 
rights). 
 To determine whether even younger children’s allocation decisions reflect social 
inequalities, researchers (42) investigated whether children ages 3 – 8 years allocated 
resources to rich and poor fictional characters based on equality (i.e., everybody should 
receive the same resources irrespective of differences) or equity (i.e., social inequalities 
should be rectified so everybody receives the same resources). Three- to 4-year-olds 
considered equity in their judgments about allocations, supporting another peer who allocated 
more resources to a poor character than a rich one, but nonetheless allocated resources 
equally when asked to divide resources between a poor and a wealthy character. By contrast, 
5- to 6-year-olds rectified the inequality of resources in their actual allocations, and judged 
both equitable and equal allocations as fair, indicating their developing concern for equity 
and their ability to coordinate the concerns of equity and equality. Seven- to 8-year-olds 
focused on rectifying the inequality in their allocations and judgments, and judged equal 
allocations less positively, demonstrating an increasing concern for rectifying inequalities. 
These findings indicate that children’s concerns for rectifying inequalities begins in early 
 
 
childhood and that their ability to coordinate different modes of allocating resources and 
reasoning about distributing those resources increases between ages 3 and 8 years. 
In summary, supporting the SRD perspective, these studies indicate that children’s 
reasoning for their decisions changed with age. Starting from a focus on equality, their 
reasoning evolved into a more complex notion of equity involving considerations of group 
processes, such as rectifying previous inequalities and ensuring rights to resources by giving 
more supplies to a disadvantaged group. Knowledge about group processes contributed to 
moral judgments about fairness and equality, such as rectifying social inequalities. This new 
research demonstrates a potentially positive role that group processes play in moral 
judgments.  Thus, knowledge and awareness of group processes can lead to ingroup bias, but 
also to moral judgments that consider group status and patterns of disadvantaged status. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have made a case for considering group and developmental 
processes when investigating how children develop in their decisions about allocating 
resources fairly. Group identity, group norms, and social status hierarchies are part of the 
world of children (and become increasingly salient and differentiated throughout life). 
Applying the SRD model to fair resource allocation, we have demonstrated that group and 
developmental processes are part of decisions about allocating resources, and that by middle 
childhood and adolescence, individuals reject members of their in-group who  support 
allocating resources unequally and rectify social inequalities based on disadvantaged status. 
Understanding how people develop the ability to allocate resources is important and 
urgent because social inequalities have widened and deepened over the past several decades 
(40). Social equality, or creating a society of equals, is both a moral principle and a pressing 
societal goal, with accompanying challenges (43). This new knowledge from developmental 
 
 
science can inform our efforts to teach children how to share resources, focus on fairness and 
equality while considering disadvantaged status, and weigh both morality and group concerns 
when allocating resources. 
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Figure 1. Resources allocated to in-group as a function of age, in-group norm, and generic norm 
(with Standard Error Bars). Source: (38). 
[Production note: Please change heading on figure to read “in-group” instead of “in-group” (removing 
the hyphen).] 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Favorability Judgments of Group Deviants 
 
[AU: This title is too long per APA style. Please shorten it and put the rest of it as a note 
below the table.] 
 
 
 Group Identity Factor 
In-group 
(Gender) 
Outgroup 
(Gender) 
 
 
 
Equality 
Factor 
Supporting 
Equal (equal 
resources for 
ingroup and 
outgroup) 
Highly favorable 
but favorability 
declined in 
support with age 
Highly favorable 
across age groups 
Supporting 
Unequal (more 
resources for 
the ingroup 
than for the 
outgroup) 
Unfavorable but 
favorability 
increased with 
age 
Highly 
unfavorable 
across all age 
groups 
 
Note: Group deviants were individuals who challenged their group's norm about equal or 
unequal allocation of resources between the in-group and outgroup. Source: (39).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. African-American hospitals disadvantaged: Mediation model for the indirect 
effect of age group on preference for the rectify allocation strategy over the perpetuate 
allocation strategy through evaluation of resource inequality and wealth status awareness, 
controlling for race. 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients and SEs are provided. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** 
p < .001.  
Source: (41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
